Whether central banks should play an active role in bank supervision and regulation is being debated both in the United States and abroad. While the Bank of England has recently been stripped of its supervisory responsibilities and several proposals in the United States have advocated removing bank supervision from the Federal Reserve System, other countries are considering enhancing central bank involvement in this area. Many of the arguments for and against these proposals hinge on the effect this change would have on the ability of the central bank to conduct monetary policy. We find that confidential supervisory information on bank ratings significantly improves forecast accuracy of variables critical to the conduct of monetary policy, which supports the argument that central banks should have bank supervision responsibility.
Is Bank Supervision Central to Central Banking? "Our central bank must continue to have hands-on involvement in supervision and regulation in order effectively to carry out its macroeconomic responsibilities. Joint responsibilities make for better supervisory and monetary policy than would result from either a supervisor divorced from economic responsibilities or a macroeconomic policymaker with no involvement in the review of individual banks' operations."
Testimony by Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs of the United States Senate, March 2, 1994.
"If the Federal Reserve were removed from the bank regulation process, would it have any significant impact on its ability to conduct monetary policy? My answer is: Clearly, it would not... It is clear that the primary role of the Federal Reserve is the conduct of monetary policy. That role is so important, I believe carrying out that function should not be diluted even slightly by having any of its resources diverted to any other function, including bank regulation."
Testimony by Donald Howard, former CFO Citicorp, before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs of the United States Senate, March 9, 1994. While the importance of central bank independence for the conduct of monetary policy has been the subject of numerous empirical studies (for example, Cukierman 1992; Alesina and Summers 1993; Posen 1995; Fuhrer 1997) , relatively little research has focused on the significance of other aspects of central banking, particularly its role in bank supervision.
Recently, however, this role has received increased attention from policymakers. Although roughly three-quarters of OECD nations assign their central banks either total or shared responsibility for bank supervision, many of these countries are 2 currently reviewing those responsibilities. For example, in mid-1997 the Bank of England was given greater independence but was stripped of its bank supervisory responsibilities. In addition, policymakers in Japan are rethinking the role and responsibilities of the Bank of Japan in bank supervision. In all these countries, a key element of the debate about whether the central bank retained, or was given, supervisory duties has been whether these responsibilities contributed to the performance of monetary policy.
The United States has not been exempt from this controversy. I. Background Sargent and Wallace (1975) , Barro (1976), and Fischer (1977) point out that in a world where expectations are formed rationally, there is room for effective and socially beneficial countercyclical monetary policy as long as the central bank possesses superior information to that available to the public.
The source of this superior information is left unspecified.
Since it is assumed that expectations are rational and that agents know the Fed's reaction function, the Fed's informational 4 advantage must be about variables other than the future course of monetary policy that drive the economy.
Recently, Romer and Romer (1996) Friedman and Kuttner (1992) and Bernanke (1990) have examined leading indicators for the economy and found an important role for financial variables. In general, these studies have examined publicly available interest rate spreads and interest rates; they have not explicitly included confidential supervisory ratings to capture problems in the banking sector.
A second possibility is that supervisory information may be important because of the role banks play in the economy. A number of studies have shown that the financial health of banks may affect either the response of the economy to a change in monetary policy instruments or the availability and terms of credit to borrowers, which could have broader implications for the overall economy (Bernanke 1983; Bernanke and Blinder 1988, 1992; Bernanke and Lown 1991; Peek and Rosengren 1995a , 1995b , 1995c Stein 1994a, 1994b; Stein 1995; Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox 1993; and Hancock and Wilcox 1992 (high probability of failure, severely deficient performance)
represent the set of banks with the most severe problems.
A large percentage of bank assets in the latter category could signal a weakening economy, for two reasons. First, the deteriorating economic conditions that resulted in the banking problems reflected in a poor CAMEL rating could be the leading edge of an impending economic slowdown, so that the CAMEL rating information serves as an early indicator of the downturn.
Second, this set of banks, being the most deeply troubled, is likely to be subjected to the most severe supervisory intervention, with the resulting supervisory restrictions producing significant changes in bank policies, such as a sharp reduction in lending, that might contribute to a subsequent economic slowdown.
Two important points about the CAMEL data need to be 
II. Data
The macroeconomic variables that are the focus of this study are the unemployment rate and the Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation rate. Most models of the Federal Reserve objective function, from Theil (1964) to Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Walsh (1995) , include these two variables. The use of these two variables has an added benefit. The CPI inflation rate is not revised subsequently, and the unemployment rate is revised only marginally, when seasonals are updated. It should be emphasized that each forecast is for a single 12 quarter, with the one-, two-, three-, and four-quarter-ahead forecasts differing in their distance from the date at which the forecast is made, not in the length of the period being forecast.
One benefit of the timing of the forecasts is that by the middle of the quarter, forecasters know the actual values of the unemployment rate and the inflation rate for the prior quarter.
Although this timing convention eliminates any concern about introducing a moving-average process into the forecast errors for the one-quarter-ahead forecasts, the possibility of a movingaverage term in the error of equation 1 still exists for the more distant quarters most relevant to monetary policy: the two-, three-and four-quarter-ahead forecasts. The results are qualitatively similar for the inflation forecast equations. For the one-quarter-ahead inflation forecast, the estimated coefficient on CAMEL5 is negative, as predicted, but is not significant. However, when the forecast horizon shifts to the more distant two-, three-, and fourquarter-ahead forecasts, the estimated coefficients are each significant. As was the case with the unemployment forecast equations, the estimated coefficient on CAMEL5 is larger, the more distant is the quarter being forecast, with the increase in the size of the coefficient even more dramatic than for the unemployment rate equations. The coefficient on the measure of supervisory information for the two-quarter-ahead forecast is more than three times as large as that for the one-quarter-ahead 16 forecast, and those for the three-and four-quarter-ahead forecasts are more than six times as large.
A problem with the estimates presented in Table 1 is that when the data set is formed by pooling the data for the three individual forecasters, OLS estimation produces consistent estimates for the coefficients, but inconsistent estimates of the standard errors. OLS estimation ignores the potential contemporaneous correlations across individual forecast errors due to shocks to the economy not anticipated by all the forecasters. Consistent estimates of the standard errors require that the estimation account for this property of the covariance structure of the forecast errors. Furthermore, as noted earlier, the two-, three-, and four-quarter-ahead forecasts would be expected to have forecast errors that follow a moving-average process. Table 2 provides the results of estimating the regressions for the pooled sample of individual forecasters after correcting for the moving-average and contemporaneous correlations by adjusting the covariance matrices to achieve efficient estimates using the procedure described by Keene and Runkle (1990) . The consistent estimates of the standard errors are significantly larger than those produced by the OLS estimation. Still, the estimated coefficients on the measure of supervisory information remain statistically significant in the unemployment rate equations for each of the four forecast horizons, as in Table 1 .
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The estimated coefficients on CAMEL5 for the three-and fourquarter-ahead inflation rate forecast equations also remain significant.
9
A particularly reassuring characteristic of the coefficient patterns on CAMEL5 is the tendency for the coefficient estimates to rise as we move from the one-quarter-ahead forecast to the four-quarter-ahead forecast. This pattern is consistent with the effect of an economic shock initially growing over time as it feeds through the economy. Furthermore, the fact that the effect appears to be delayed slightly more in the inflation equations than in the unemployment equations is consistent with a large number of models: for example, standard estimates of the Phillips curve imply that the real economy tends to react earlier than do prices.
Supervisory Information, Forecaster by Forecaster
The much larger sample size generated by pooling the individual forecaster data enhances the power of the test.
Nonetheless, one might still want to consider the results obtained by estimating separate equations for each individual forecaster. Even though the much smaller sample size is likely to substantially reduce the t-statistics on the estimated coefficients, the size of the estimated coefficients can provide a feel for the extent to which the results in Table 2 For the equations based on the two-, three-and fourquarter-ahead unemployment rate forecasts, the estimated coefficient patterns for the measure of supervisory information are also quite consistent, both across forecasters and compared to the estimates in Table 2 . The coefficient estimates are 10 significant for three of the four forecasters for the twoquarter-ahead forecasts, and for all four of the three-quarter-19 ahead forecasts. For the four-quarter-ahead forecasts, RSQE and the Blue Chip equations have CAMEL5 effects that are significant at traditional levels, while that for DRI is significant at the 10 percent level. Furthermore, the coefficient estimates for each of the forecasters exhibit the same pattern as shown in Table 2 , with the coefficients generally rising as the quarter being forecast becomes more distant. The generally reduced significance levels for the CAMEL5 coefficients for the individual forecasters compared to those in the pooled sample in Table 2 reflect in large part the fact that the power of the test has been reduced substantially relative to that for the pooled sample. However, these estimates do highlight that the significant coefficients on CAMEL5 in Table 2 are not due to a single forecaster. Rather, the coefficient patterns are produced consistently across each of the separate sources of private forecasts. Table 3B Is such information useful when events are more moderate?
To answer this question, we reestimated the equations reported in The effect of supervisory data on the forecast errors for the unemployment rate even over this restricted sample, shown in Table 4 , is similar to the effect reported in Table 2 . When the subperiod containing the most severe banking problems is excluded, the estimated coefficients on CAMEL5 for the onequarter-ahead and two-quarter-ahead forecasts are 0.091 and 0.174, respectively, virtually identical to the results over the entire period of 0.091 and 0.175. Although the standard errors are now larger, the estimated coefficients are still significant.
The coefficients for the three-and four-quarter-ahead forecasts are smaller than those shown in Table 2 , although they remain larger than that on the one-quarter-ahead forecast, and the standard errors are larger, perhaps due to the reduced sample size, so that the coefficients are no longer significant at the 5 percent level.
The results for the inflation rate equations are somewhat stronger when the period of the most severe banking problems is excluded. The CAMEL5 coefficient for the one-quarter-ahead 22 forecast equation changes from -0.141 to -0.227, while that for the two-quarter-ahead forecast equation changes from -0.468 to -0.731. For the three-and four-quarter-ahead forecasts, the coefficients also are larger (in absolute value) than those in Table 2 . The measure of supervisory information adds significantly to the forecasting ability of the equations at the two-, three-, and four-quarter-ahead forecast horizons. Thus, the results for inflation are actually stronger in Table 4 than Identifying why supervisory data provide such useful information in forecasting inflation and unemployment, and whether these findings extend to other countries, should be a productive area for future research.
1.
While forecasting economic activity is a critical component of the conduct of monetary policy, the information obtained through its bank supervisory role also can make important contributions to other dimensions of central bank responsibilities. Among these responsibilities are avoiding serious disruptions to the payment system, avoiding systemic problems emanating from the banking sector, and serving as lender of last resort. While these are important issues in the United States, they may take on even greater importance in countries with less developed financial markets.
2.
On January 1, 1997, the CAMEL rating system was expanded to CAMELS. The S stands for "sensitivity to market risk," and is intended to measure how well prepared a bank is to handle changes in interest rates, exchange rates, and commodity or equity prices.
3.
These two series avoid the serious problem of forecasting a variable using one set of base year relative prices and comparing it to an actual realization that uses another set, which occurs with the GDP forecasts when the base year changes.
4.
Hansen and Hodrick (1980) point out that the errors over longer forecast horizons should follow predictable moving-average processes. In this study, since the forecasts are for nonoverlapping quarters, the moving average process is not introduced by construction. Rather, the moving average processes occur because a shock that arises subsequent to the time at which the quarterly forecasts are made is likely to have persistent effects.
5.
The inconsistency caused by this correlation across forecasters could be corrected if each forecaster's quarterly forecast were given in the Blue Chip. Unfortunately, the quarterly forecasts are provided only for the consensus forecast. Only the annual forecasts are provided for the individual forecasters.
6.
The results presented here do not include the oil shock dummy variables, since quantifying the precise quarters the oil shocks occurred is somewhat subjective. We include two dummy variables to control for oil shocks. The first one has a value of one associated with forecasts of unemployment and inflation rates for 1979:I through 1979:IV and for 1990:III, the periods of large oil price increases associated with the second OPEC price shock and the outbreak of the Gulf War, and zero otherwise. The second dummy variable has a value of one associated with Endnotes 30 forecasts for 1986:I, when oil prices collapsed, and zero otherwise. To avoid concerns that the results are predicated on the periods we selected, we simply provide the results from the regressions that do not include the oil shock dummy variables. Omitting the dummy variables only increases the probability that the results would find no effect for the supervisory information.
7.
In addition, we find that the moving-average terms tend to be less important when controlling for the oil shocks, much of whose effect was not anticipated by forecasters and accounts for most of the largest forecast errors in the inflation equation.
8.
The standard efficiency test of the forecast, testing whether the constant is zero and the coefficient on the forecast is equal to one, is no longer valid for our specification. First, the null hypothesis for this efficiency test would assume that the forecasters have the confidential supervisory information, which is false. Second, as will be discussed later, the standard error estimates are inconsistent.
9.
If one includes the oil supply shock dummy variables in the inflation forecast equations, the CAMEL5 coefficient in the twoquarter-ahead forecast equation also is significant.
10. Note that some of the differences in the coefficient estimates across forecasters may be attributable to the fact that they differ in the sample period they cover. The DRI and RSQE samples begin in 1978:I, while Blue Chip and GSU begin in 1980:I and 1980:III, respectively.
11. The CAMEL data are only useful if the Federal Reserve understands how the rating is formulated and how the rating process may be changing. The Federal Reserve not only regulates the holding company and state member banks, it frequently jointly conducts examinations with other regulators. This provides information not only about the banks, but also about how other regulators are rating banks and conducting exams. Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at the 5 percent level. **Significant at the 1 percent level. Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at the 5 percent level. **Significant at the 1 percent level. Note: The standard errors in the two quarter-ahead-forecast equation are corrected for MA(1) errors; the threequarter-ahead-forecast equation is corrected for MA(1) and MA (2) errors; and the four-quarter-ahead forecast equation is corrected for MA(1), MA(2), and MA(3) errors.
Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at the 5 percent level. **Significant at the 1 percent level. Note: The standard errors in the two quarter-ahead-forecast equation are corrected for MA(1) errors; the three-quarter-ahead-forecast equation is corrected for MA(1) and MA (2) errors; and the four-quarter-ahead forecast equation is corrected for MA(1), MA(2), and MA(3) errors.
Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at the 5 percent level. **Significant at the 1 percent level. Note: The standard errors in the two quarter-ahead-forecast equation are corrected for MA(1) errors; the three-quarter-ahead-forecast equation is corrected for MA(1) and MA(2) errors; and the four-quarter-ahead forecast equation is corrected for MA(1), MA(2), and MA(3) errors.
Standard errors are in parentheses. * Significant at the 5 percent level. **Significant at the 1 percent level.
